In Vitro Infidelium
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I am by no means making a "broad cultural critique." I am concretely describing how the claim that "all HGRV evidence to date is due to contamination" is logically and empirically unsubstantiated, and furthermore how rhetorical sleight of hand (conflating questions, substituting assumptions for the null hypothesis) is being used to distract from this chasm between evidence and conclusion. Even in the context of the BWG, while there is some indirect evidence of contamination, there is no direct evidence that could be used to support the positive claim that every single positive found in the study is the result of contamination. What is being perpetrated is "contamination until proven otherwise" while logically it should be "unknown until proven to be contamination, infection, or something else." (I'm using the word "prove" loosely here to mean essentially "empirically supported.")
I am well aware of the realities and limitations of real-world science. The point is that these limitations must be acknowledged as such when and where they contribute to unsubstantiated conclusions, especially when they require the substitution of assumption for missing data. However, you seem to be arguing that the existence of these limitations means we can alter the essence of what empirical rationality demands in order to accommodate them. If, e.g., virology were conducted by having John Coffin consult his magic eight ball, the reality of this situation doesn't miraculously make the conclusions rationally sound. Yet this seems to be what you would suggest: truth defined by convention, not truth defined by reason.
The fact that so many virologists are reaching the "everything is contamination" conclusion on the basis of so much assumption, while steadfastly refusing to acknowledge the role or even existence of this assumption, is why many people have become suspicious. Such conspicuous professional disingenuousness is unacceptable when so much is on the line.
I don't understand how this is in any way 'particular' to the BWG - all of the points you make are explicable in terms of of a disatisfaction with (in shorthand) Popperian science. Where in practice is there a paragon of the science of 'proof' (as empiricism) and 'truth' that you affirm is the ideal ? I don't think such a thing exists, there are whole volumes of debate (Karl Popper on the empirical base of science ) but science as practised primarily follows a utilitarian application of Popper's basic propositions. Criticising the BWG because it proceded in the way that all other science procedes hardly seems useful. Personally I have a lot of time for Kuhne's critique of Popper, but that can't tell us anything useful about any single scientific project. Though in any event I'm not in anyway interested in 'truth' as a scientific issue, whether such were to be arrived at by convention or reason. Science can give us probabilities, and those probabilities can be reassessed in the light of new data, but this is not truth, and while reason is certainy required to make sense of probabalistic answers, I don't see how inductive reasoning can provide useful conclusions of 'fact' in the absence of measurable phenomena.
IVI